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Mr. President 
Mr. Permanent Secretary 
Ministers 
Ladies and Gentlemen: 
I wish to begin by once again thanking the Council of SELA and the Permanent 
Secretariat for giving me this opportunity to address you and bring you the views 
of CEPAL concerning the common problems and concerns of Latin America and of both 
institutions. 
On this occasion5 the privilege is even greater, inasmuch as this is one of the 
most important meetings ever held by this great forum. 
Indeed, SELA, the only political body for economic co-ordination and 
consultation in the region, could not avoid being affected, as is all of Latin 
America, by the difficult times the region has gone through as a result of the 
events with which we are all familiar and which have represented a serious blow to 
a sister nation. 
For the first time, and for painful reasons, the region has been made aware of 
the extent to which, when faced with truly difficult circumstances, it is left to 
its own devices and its own capacity for collective response. As a result of this 
phenomenon, Latin America has been brought face to face with a political and 
economic crisis and a crisis as regards its place in world politics; this must 
lead us to do some serious thinking and to discover that along with dangers, a crisis 
also brings opportunities. 
Yesterday the President of Venezuela, in a masterly manner and with true 
Bolivarian inspiration, outlined the circumstances that have shaken the geopolitical 
make-up of the region and drew a visionary and constructive picture of a future 
based on collaboration and friendship. 
Many opportunities may be opened up by a renewed and positive vision of Latin 
American action: i.e., a vision in which regional co-operation and continental unity 
are not ''against something" but rather "in favour of something". In favour of 
fully utilizing the region's capacity for joint action to obtain positive results 
not only for Latin America but also for all those countries with which this region 
-which is increasingly interdependent with the international economy- has and will 
continue to have relations. 
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This new appreciation of regional co-operation must not be based only on a 
legitimate reaction aimed at seeking collective economic security vis-a-vis acts 
of external economic agression that might in future affect the region. 
As you all know, ever since the 1950s CEPAL has been working enthusiastically 
and with great conviction for the cause of regional integration, and provided the 
forum where the first co-operation schemes were drawn up. There was a strong 
motivation behind that movement, which subsequently grew and e>q>anded as a result 
of the dynamics of events and institutions: the need to ejqpand the narrow and 
limited domestic markets to protect new units of production that could operate tiith 
reasonable degrees of productivity and efficiency. 
Today a new and singularly serious development has shaken the world: the great 
crisis of the international economic system. If at that tine integration was 
justified as a mechanism for promoting the economy and for breaking open the 
isolated compartments of domestic markets, today it is an absolutely indispensable 
element to which we must resort in order to lessen the impact of the international 
economic crisis that has hit the main centres and, consequently, the entire periphery 
The central idea to which I wish to address myself today is precisely the idea 
that a new kind of regional co-operation should be built on the legacy we will now 
have as a result of. having had to face the current world crisis: on the one hand, 
there is a need to consider complex antirecessive or adjustment policies in every 
country of the hemisphere and, on the other, there is a need to take up the 
challenges that will arise as the centres recover and as new patterns are set in the 
economic development of the industrial countries. 
, It is our belief that both things will call, for a renewal of the forms of 
co-operation and their incorporation into both our antirecessive policies and our 
future development strategies. 
The great crisis of the 1980s 
I will not dwell here on the crisis now affecting the great centres, which has 
also been projected over the entire periphery and especially over Latin America. 
Yesterday President Herrera Campins painted a sombre picture of that crisis in which 
he referred to the reports of our organization. We ourselves have just reported on 
it to the United Nations Economic and Social Council. 
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All indicators, even the most recent OECD ones, point to a prolonged crisis 
which constitutes without a doubt the deepest and most serious recession we have 
experienced in the entire period since the war. 
This year the growth rate of the centres will not be over 0.3% and it is 
estimated that the anxiously awaited recovery will only mean -with luck- a growth 
rate for the gross domestic product of 2.<+% in 1983: that is to say, considerably 
lower than the averages for the 1970s. 
Along with this, unemployment now affects over 30 million persons in the OECD 
countries: a phenomenon attributable not only to the drop in demand, but also to a 
complex set of factors of a structural nature which can only be overcome by making 
profound changes in the future direction of the developed economies. I will return 
to this point later on. 
Even though inflation has begun to slacken -and this is a positive development-
questions arise regarding the capacity for keeping down the rate at which prices 
increase, once the recovery policies are under way. 
But the most important feature, which is undoubtedly a new phenomenon in this 
type of crisis, has been the exceptionally high interest rates prevailing in the 
major international financial centres. These rates have unquestionably been the 
highest for the last 50 years, and this has had a profound impact on the economies 
of the centres, the flows of capital and the volume of investments: all factors 
which undermine the recovery and especially the rate and nature of future economic 
growth. 
We are all familiar with the bitter controversies to which these policies have 
given rise in the northern countries. But what is even more disquieting -perhaps 
more than the indicators themselves- is the atmosphere of uncertainty, confusion 
and, above all, contradiction between the different diagnoses and-prognoses. 
"Forecasting capacity" is lower throughout the world than at any time-since 
the Second World War, and we already know how this affects expectations, which are 
key factors in the orderly functioning of the world markets. 
The reactions are well known: undeclared trade-wars, a lack of transparency 
in the markets, a return to open or covert protectionist policies: all developments 
which represent backward steps from what we had thought to be definitive achievements 
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The effect of this situation on the periphery has not been, long in coming. 
As is often the cases these recessive phenomena become enlarged as they are 
transmitted to the developing world. In this case, as in so many others, we could 
recall the saying that when the centres get a cold the periphery gets pneumonia. 
The year 19,81 will, go down in history as the worst in the economy of the region 
for the last 40 years. And I greatly fear, gentlemen, that 1982 will not be any 
better. 
In 1981, the growth rate of the gross domestic product of Latin America dropped 
to 1.7%, which is considerably lower than the population growth rate and means that 
per capita income also-dropped. The average inflation of the region as a whole 
reached almost unprecedented heights, of close on 60%. The balance of payments 
current account deficit, of the order of US$ 38 billion, made it necessary to 
resort to new external financing, particularly from private sources, which raised 
the debt to levels close to US$ 240 billion by the end of the year. Of course, 
when economic activity either declines or grows very slowly, it is the lower 
socio-economic sectors that suffer the most. In that regard, we only have to look 
at the figures for unemployment and inflation to see without a doubt who is paying 
the highest share of the cost of the recession. 
Not all problems have their origin in the external crisis, of course. But. 
there is no question that a large proportion of them do. 
• Over the. last three years, the. terms of trade have dropped by 30%, which means 
that in 1981 alone the region lost US$ 5 billion that it would otherwise have 
received. 
. The high interest rates have meant another drain on resources. For each point 
that the interest rates go up, the region must transfer to the exterior approximately 
one billion dollars. It may be said that during 1981, around US$ 5 billion was 
transferred to the exterior just because of the increase in average interest rates 
with respect to 1980. 
Moreover, the financial and fiscal difficulties of the centres have led them 
to reduce their contributions to external bilateral and multilateral co-operation, 
especially for Latin. America. 
And, finally,-.in the face of the disequilibria affecting the region, the. 
international banks have begun to show a growing reluctance to supply additional 
resources. 
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Antirecessive policies: international collaboration and regional co-operation 
The first and most pressing problem at the present tin® is without a doubt 
the recessive crisis and the need to adopt internal policies to deal with it. 
Perhaps we might begin with a remark that is as obvious as it is necessary. 
There is no way of keeping the countries of the region from suffering the 
painful cost of the adjustments they must make to adapt to the external situation. 
It would be naive to deny this. It is also true, as statistics show, that the 
various Latin American countries are in very different situations. Some have 
followed more cautious policies than others, which means that they are now able to 
weather the storm at a lower economic and social cost. But unfortunately, that is 
not the situation of most of them. 
There will be plenty of time to analyse the economic process of the last few 
years, which along with tremendous advances of the productive forces also nourished 
contradictions that are now taking their toll under the pressure of unfavourable 
external factors. A distinction must also be made between those factors that are 
external in origin and those that arise from the contradictions of internal policies: 
unrealistic exchange rates, excessive growth of expenditure, financial permissiveness 
vis-a-vis easy facilities for external indebtedness, excessively rigid policies of 
openness, etc. This is neither the time nor the place to discuss these questions, 
however. 
What Latin America must do now is to make massive adjustments, involving a 
period of highly pragmatic and flexible economic policies, with a high degree of 
austerity and efficiency in the use of resources and with an imaginative mix of 
economic policies in all areas of public activity. 
But whatever the degree of adjustment required, it is absolutely clear that 
the adjustment will be much more bearable, economically and socially, if two 
important conditions are met: intelligent international collaboration that is suited 
to the circumstances, and a dynamic response from regional co-operation. 
International collaboration suited to the circumstances 
I think it is very important at this time for the countries of the region to 
identify clearly where they must concentrate their efforts to seek external 
co-operation in the context of the overall objectives of the lamentably delayed 
process of the global negotiations and the position of the developing countries 
in that process. 
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In order to do this, we must begin by stressing that the problems now being 
experienced by most of the countries of the-region (and I might add in passing that 
similar traumas are being experienced by other industrializing countries) are of 
such a magnitude that they cannot be-.dealt with, from the purely technocratic 
standpoint of traditional cures or conventional adjustments. 
Thus, for example, in addition to being the most important problem in the 
current economic situation, external indebtedness calls.for innovative and action-
oriented policies, both in the field of international financial co-operation and .. 
in that of international trade relations. • 
Under the. present circumstances, with overall exports of goods from the.region 
coming close to US$ 100 billion, Latin America has to make interest payments which 
this year will amount to nearly US$ 30 billion -i.e., 30% of total export income-
not counting amortization payments,. As many of the loans were granted in the late 
1970s, many of the grace periods will begin to expire this year or next year, thus 
substantially raising the amortization payments. It should be noted that for the 
developing world as a whole, the average amortization period.for public debts 
is approximately 17 years, whereas for-Latin America it is only 11 .years. . Countries 
with intermediate industrial economies similar to those of-Latin America, such as 
the south-east Asian countries, are given average periods of over 16 years. 
There is no doubt that a reduction of interest rates would give us a. 
healthy respite. But this does not change the nature of the problem nor the 
painful and perhaps unbearable implications of making an adjustment through the 
reduction of internal activity, which might result from the conventional 
application of the criteria used. 
To face this challenge, and given the mediocre prospects of the demand for 
and prices of basic commodities, the necessary international .co-operation must be 
based on new criteria, that will be appropriate for the qualitative change which 
the magnitude of the problems has imposed on the region. .Thus: 
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(a) At a time when most of thé disequilibria in the balance of payments are 
beyond the control of the countries themselves or are beyond their normal 
adjustment capacity, the criteria of conditionality that operate in every exercise 
aimed at supporting the balance of payments and reprogramming the debt profile 
cannot be applied in the conventional manner without provoking serious and perhaps 
unbearable economic, social and political disequilibria. 
(b) The principle of a "pure and sinple conditionally" cannot be sustained 
without relating it to thé principles of "additionality". In other words, at times 
such as these, the private and public financial sectors must understand that the 
best way of avoiding the difficulties of the adjustment period is not simply to cut 
expenditures, which usually leads to a short-lived slowdown in inflation rather 
than real stability. 
(c) In recent years, harsh effects have been felt from the fallacy of 
classifying or discriminating against Latin America in the multilateral credit 
institutions, on the assumption that the time had ended when the region needed 
access to public credit, and that it could now operate alone, with the.support of 
the private financial sector. The current financial situation and the reduction 
in financing from private sources have shown the simplistic thinking behind such 
a hypothesis and have made it clear how important it is for international public 
and private credit to reinforce cach other and thus make it possible to improve 
the debt profile. Latin America cannot remain impassive in the face of the 
relative shrinking of multilateral credit in recent years and the probable 
continuation of this trend in the future. Net transfers of public credit to 
Latin America, which in 1978 represented US$ 13 billion, did not even reach 
US$ 1 billion in 1980. 
(d) At a time when world trade is becoming less and less transparent, when 
dangerous protectionist trends are being suggested and implemented, it is more 
than ever necessary to maintain the export capacity of the region so that it can 
meet its international commitments. In the face of the sustained and inevitable 
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decline in the.terras of trade, it is crucially important to keep up export volumes 
(especially of non-traditional. exports), for which purpose the region has 
established a. vigorous installed capacity, as shown by the way the trade balance 
has behaved in recent years. This new defence capacity is reflected in the volume 
of exports, which has grown even in the midst of. the present recessive conditions. 
I believe that the magnitude and the generalized nature of the problems 
make it necessary for the region to reappraise all these issues and take- action 
in international forums .-especially financial ones- to promote the new approaches 
which are advisable under the circumstances. '. 
On an earlier occasion we. proposed the need to establish a financial safety 
net. Today we are even more convinced that it is necessary to open new, credit 
facilities in both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to ensure 
positive support for the adjustment process of our countries with a. view towards 
their development; this would not only be in the interests of the financial health 
of the world but also of the. contribution that the region itself could make to 
the productive recovery of the industrial world, if it could continue, to expand 
its imports. . 
An appropriate debate, especially at the level of the central banks and 
ministries of the région, could now inspire the. great agencies of the 
international financial system to take new approaches to this topic which is so 
important for achieving the "adjustment with development" of the regional economy. 
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A new concept of regional co-operation 
It is within the above context that we visualize a renex^ed role for regional 
co-operation. 
Let us begin by recognizing a fact, which should be made clear from thè 
start: regional co-operation cannot be a substitute for. world co-operation. By 
definition, it is a supplement to the latter, whose duty it is in the present 
circumstances to moderate or slow down the impact of the international recession. 
It is encouraging in this connexion to see the active and vigorous progress 
of intra-Latin American trade relations in recent years. 
Let us take a look at sone figures. 
In the past trenta years, the share of regional trade in the total trade of 
Latin America rose fvov\ 8° in 1960 to 15.5% in 1981. 
Specificali^, trade in manufactures, which is the key to the industrial 
progress of the region and which accounted for 10%'of total exports in 1961, novi 
represents nearly 36?.. In the ALADI countries, exports of manufactures T-ithin 
the region make up 56% of the total interregional trade volume. 
Kot all the achievements are to be attributed, to formal integration 
machinerv. There is no doubt that a significant contribution has been made by 
the reciprocal understanding which.the systens of integration gave to the private 
business sector; export promotion policies; and the .crowing competitiveness of 
our national industry. Furthermore, tre must recognize that the very policies of 
trade openness undertaken by most of the countries of the region have also had a 
positive effect on regional trade. 
,rhatever the causes, there is one significant conclusion: we are in the 
presence of an import and export potential which is becoming a vigorous reality. 
We have worked out so™.e hypotheses in CEPAL which are worthy of attention. 
If the region manages to recover the economic growth rate of the 1960s, that 
is to say, an annual rate of 6%, foreign trade with the rest of the world should 
crow by 8% annually, and the share of regional' trade, which, is currently 16-, 
should double by the 1990s. This is a great and difficult challenge, but not 
impossible. 
How can this be done? 
- 10 -
The SELA Secretariat has submitted a document to this meeting which- brings 
together some important initiatives in various fields and which, in addition to 
beinf a positive response as regards emergency measures .in the case of possible 
sanctions, should constitute àn authentic programme of work to which CEPAL will 
gladly offer it's most dedicated collaboration. ... 
But'let us begin with some specific and'immediate issues which could mean, 
very substantial' progress for regional trade. 
'' I should like to mention'three areas which I believe are of immediate and 
significant importance for"expanding trade without requiring huge efforts; 
(a) Promotion of a dialogue among those responsible for the foreign trade of 
the countries of the region, for the purpose of eliminating barriers of any kind 
which still create unnecessary stuwblinn blocks to interregional trade. The same 
climate of ' clarity that vie are asking for tor Id trade should be required of the 
region too.- , . ' , • 1 
(b) Stimulation of the State and private banks concerned with foreign trade 
to work out and promote financial'incentives -already very well known iri the 
developed countries- in order 'to encourage» from the financial end, new and existing 
trade flows' in the region. 
(c) Protiro'tion of a dialogue amonp the private sectors connected with trade, 
whose understanding of thè problems and opportunities could open new paths for 
trade expansion. In this vein we would like to mention some important efforts 
which have been made by CEPAL,:such as nutting business groups into contact with 
one another so that, by proposing reciprocal trade targets-with official support, 
they can accelerate and stimulate the known possibilities already open to" trade. 
It is not only a question here of setting up those lonrr-term initiatives 
which require sustained efforts and considerable time, but also of stimulating 
others which are right'at hand and which could save time and .create vigorous 
stimuli io trade in the next- few years. 
In the final analysis, regional trade must be. taken specially into account 
in the adoption of the antirecessive policies which.the countries of the'region 
will have to tackle. . .. . 
One final reflection: we cannot allow the balance-of-payments defence 
measures which are bound to proliferate in the next few years to damage the 
existing trade flows by creating unnecessary barriers and making us retrace our 
steps over the productive path we have taken in recent years. 
Towards a new approach to Latin American development 
'Ve must also prepare ourselves for the profound changes which will,occur in 
the international economy after the recessive adjustment period of the 1980s. 
Latin America'cannot ignore the fact that the industrial countries are not 
going to emerge from this crisis by reproducing the economic structures of the 
past. 
There are factors which indicate there x*ill be substantial changes. 
At the recent Versailles meeting, the central countries emphasized the big 
challenges arising from the technological development of the modem world, and the 
inability of current economic structures to provide productive work to those who 
are currently unemployed and those who will be seeking work, in the future. 
There are serious doubts whether the millions of unemployed existing today 
in the industrial world can be absorbed once¡the recovery has occurred. At the 
same time, the changes in trade' relations raise previously unknown questions. 
Latin America, for example, must take into account the policy of recovery 
of markets being undertaken by the central countries, which for the moment is 
producing a new form of protectionism that has had an impact on the industrial 
activities we thought were finally within our reach on account of the comparative 
advantages offered by our region, . . 
Nor can we ignore the fact that the new advances being.made in genetic 
engineering are creating new competitors in the production of food products in. 
which we have traditionally had clear-cut advantages in the international market. 
This is to mention only a few of the issues on which Latin America, a 
continent constantly expanding towards the exterior, must take a position. I do 
not propose here to delve more deeply into these topics than is necessary. There 
will be other occasions to bring to the attention of this Council CEPAL's 
reflections and work in these areas. 
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But there are some conclusions which do need to be put forward here. 
The style of development which is currently being imposed as the sole model 
for the region, i.e., that of growing linkages with the developed world and the 
elevation of exports to this market into the main stimulus for our internal growth, 
cannot be the only motive force for the growth of our region. 
This subject has caused various controversies. In some cases the development 
model of the countries of Southeast Asia has created powerful illusions, but these 
have been showing increasing signs óf weakness and great vulnerability. 
Latin America cannót propose to reproduce within its borders a type of 
growth based only on exports to the rest of the world. There is no room in our 
region for a Hong Kong-style development model. Our economic, social and 
political reality is undoubted^ very different. 
We must think along the lines of a new development scheme which, will take 
special account of the potential of the domestic market, the capacity for exports 
to the rest of the world, and the vigorous opportunities of the regional market. 
It is enough to recall that at the present time the regional market is 
already worth close on one billion dollars. This is a "critical mass" which, in 
itself, opens up totally new channels for oùr joint efforts. 
Please understand me correctly. I ;am not advocating a reproduction of 
import substitution poiicies at anv cost, at the hieih price of anachronistic 
protectionist policies. Facing the world and regional challenge will require 
diversification, efficiency, and above all a high technological level. 
What' is important to bear in mind is that Latin America, in this new strategy,, 
cannot ignore the potential of the regional market, and whatever the solution 
adopted for its future development, it must necessarily include the proper use of 
this market. f . 
The same could be said of the markets of other developing regions, which 
could expand through effective South-South co-operation. 
In conclusion, Mr. President: 
We are going through times of deep anxiety but also of fascinating 
challenges. 
This meeting should be the beginning of a process of rethinking about this 
valuable capital which we have been creating in the course of time: the regional 
market. Let us approach it without preconceptions and in a spirit of great realism, 
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The regional market cannot provide everything, nor can it take the place of 
the essential linkage of Latin America with the rest of the world. 
But let us be aware that it has an important immediate role to play and that 
it will be a key variable in the world in which we will have to live in the next 
few decades. 
We must approach this with great responsibility, with special awareness that 
in the process of common growth what is important is not so much the mathematical 
distribution of gains as the objective of ensuring that at the end of the road we 
will all be better off. 
Having said this, I should like to end on a note of realistic and prudent 
optimism. 
Ho region of the developing world has at its disposal such promising assets 
as our region possesses. 
Our natural resources, the quality and.training of our people, our installed 
industrial capacity and, above all, the experience we have acquired -both good 
and bad- place us in a privileged position to face the arduous circumstances of 
the present time. 
To confirm that these are difficult times, all vie have to do is look at the 
economic and social indicators of the past five-year periods, which give the lie to 
the facile assertion that nothing has happened. ^ 
Our region must face the future by recognizing the seriousness of the cuf^yfit: t 
problems but maintaining its faith that with suitable domestic policies and ' ̂  r 
intelligent and pragmatic international co-operation, not only can we take care of 
our economic development and seek a solution to our challenging social injustices, 
but we can also give a strong impulse to world growth. 
With the confidence we have gained by facing the facts, and with the 
inspiration we can gain from the political will to work together, we need not fear 
the present, and still less the future. 

